Renewing the Western Alliance

  Jürgen Rüttgers  Jürgen Rüttgers is the former Prime Minister of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia and the former Federal Minister of Education, Science, Research and Technology in the Government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. This essay is adapted from his “Remarks on the Future of the Western Alliance” given during visits to Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, and Harvard University in February and March. FROM THE SPRING / SUMMER 2014 issue of THE DORCHESTER REVIEW   THE UNITED STATES REMAINS the last global superpower in the aftermath of the Cold War. It has the strongest army and the strongest technological base, but the United States no longer has the strongest economy in all industries. In the past twenty years we have experienced a globalization of economies, of science, of knowledge, and of media. And that has resulted in an altered balance of power. Many national states, especially in Europe, have problems with these altered power relations. In Europe many parliamentary groups and governments have the impression that the United States is on a quest to find a new position in a globalized world. Many believe that the Americans have no clear idea as to where they will stand or what their position will be in the twenty-first century. The same uncertainty about the future applies in many circles in Europe. Nowadays, everyone has the feeling that major changes are underway around the world, that the world order is faced with significant structural alterations. We see the rise of China and India. What sort of role will the United States play? What will be Russia’s role? The crisis of Ukraine shows that Russia is rebuilding a new Russian imperium. What is happening in the Near East and its “newly industrialized countries”? What does the future hold for Europe? In history there have been five models of world orders, as German historian Harald Müller wrote in Building a New World Order (2008). The first is an “empire” — a group of states or peoples under centralized rule. Abundant means and resources, an efficient administration, military supremacy, civilian and cultural progress make it possible to rule huge territories without violent enforcement. The problem of empires is overstretch, as Paul M. Kennedy wrote in 1989. The second model is “hegemony” — a sort of soft rule with less violence and global impact. The other models, according to Müller, are “alliances,” a “world republic,” and “global governance.” In the fifty years prior to 1990, the United States of America and the Soviet Union were world powers. The Cold War and the Iron Curtain divided the world into East and West. These two key factors prevented those powers from developing an imperial character. This changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Iron Curtain, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since at least 9/11, the United States can be said to have taken on imperial features. In his book Amerika (2013), the Dutch journalist and writer Geert Mak has described the American empire as a
second-hand world power that came into being in the late phase of all other world empires. Therefore it must now not only pay the price for its own mistakes but also for the mistakes of its predecessors. Before the Americans had set foot on Vietnamese territory, the French had already turned the country to rubble, just like the Russians had done in Afghanistan and the British in Iraq. And not to forget — they all had already failed in the Middle East.  
According to Geert Mak, “Most Americans continue to deny that their country is a world power because today’s reality is in full contradiction to the ideal of a nation that guides the world on its path to freedom.” They cannot see how a nation founded on the idea of liberty could at the same time behave like an imperial power. I believe that the United States has failed to notice that it is impossible to create post-colonial empires. An empire needs not only military and economic power — what it needs just as much are allies. All attempts to establish a “new world order,” as President George H.W. Bush put it, have so far  been unsuccessful. NATO as the central alliance of free democracies in the Western world has lost significance, influence, and power. The attempt to establish new alliances in the Pacific region (for example, with Japan and Australia) stagnated at an early stage. The “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” which Dwight D. Eisenhower already regretted in his 1961 farewell address, has resulted in dangers to American liberties and the democratic process. “The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” This prediction of President Eisenhower has proven true as the NSA spying scandal seems to show, according to Geert Mak. There is also the overstretch of military power reflected in more than 1,000 US military bases that are maintained in other countries. All this causes the United States to put its freedom at risk as the concomitant debt has compelled the country to give up its freedom to the financial markets. American politics underestimate to what extent the NSA’s obsessive collection of data and information adversely affects the global standing of the United States. Anyone who upholds freedom, democracy, and human rights under the rule of law must not violate civil liberties. He must not monitor and spy out friends and allies. Not even for the sake of security! One can certainly live in safety under a dictatorship. But to live in freedom and security is only possible in a democratic legal system. The British journalist and historian Timothy Garton Ash writes that the current world crisis is mostly a result of the poor condition of the transatlantic relations. For this he blames above all the imbalance of power as the main cause, in his book Free World, America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West (2005). Economically speaking Europe and the United States are, he maintains, on a par. Yet if we consider the American military and culture, the United States will definitely remain superior for many years to come. Add to this what Garton Ash refers to as the “American creed” — “a distinct firm belief in freedom, universal values and faith in God.” Contemporary Europe cannot produce anything comparable. In this context Europeans, and especially the Germans, are discussing what has to be changed in Europe to make us more attractive to our partners. At the “Munich Security Conference,” Joachim Gauck, the German federal president, and members of Germany’s government made forceful statements that “as a good partner, Germany has to get involved earlier, more resolutely and in a more substantial way.”   MY ANSWER IS THAT in the twenty-first century we need no new imperium. What we need, in fact, is to rebuild the Western Alliance which has to be based on a system of common rules. The Western powers must not be divided. The unity of the West requires more Europe, not less. In other words, more common foreign policy in a united Europe. Many of today’s problems in the Balkan region or Africa or the Caucasus are as complex as those which Schleswig-Holstein was faced with in the nineteenth century. Lord Palmerston once quipped that only three men could understand them — one of them is crazy, the second one died, and he himself could not remember. In the Balkans, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, Europe has shared responsibility with the US However, this was frequently done under pressure, with a bad conscience and without a jointly agreed strategy. A European Army would be a strong driving force for a common foreign and security policy. It would also have a significant impact on the EU’s financial policy. Currently, the European states spend more than €200 billion on defence. According to the European Council of Foreign Relations, a significant proportion of this defence spending is wasted. Secondly, more Europe instead of less means: Europe is a community of values. Not all states in this region belong or can contribute. Community is only possible if based on democracy, constitutionality, the protection of human rights and of minorities, on independent justice free of corruption, an open market economy and reasonable social standards. The third point is: Europe has found new ground after two world wars on which to establish itself. The target has to be a real European democracy. Some believe that this is a utopia. But the United States also had to go a long way to become a real republic of federal states. When you read the Federalist Papers you realize that nothing is stronger than an idea whose time has come. The United States of Europe is a historical experiment, an experiment of a permanent unity of people who were at war with each other for many centuries. One thing is sure: It’s not a question of dreams; it is a question of surviving. The war against terrorism cannot be won on the fields of Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere. It is necessary to win the hearts and the heads of hundred millions of people in the Islamic world. The empire of Rome did not decline because a new empire rose. The Roman Empire decayed from within, caused by the arrogance of power and the lack of an idea that could have inspired the people. Communism in the Soviet Union went down because the real socialism lost touch with reality. In the end nobody believed anymore what the leaders said. The West did not win the Cold War against the Eastern Bloc because of its military and economic predominance. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellite system imploded because the ideas set forth in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 12 June 1776 and the Déclaration des droit de l’homme et du citoyen of 26 August 1789 were stronger than the Communist Manifesto. It took cruel wars in the two centuries between 1789 and 1989-90 for the normative project of the West to be effectively enforced. The concepts of the rule of law, the constitutional state, the separation of powers (also called the checks and balances), representative democracy, and inalienable human rights — these ideas which are based on the pillars of the Christian-Jewish Western world (the Occident) and the Age of Enlightenment, have proved to be compelling for the people behind the Iron Curtain. Such were the dreams of the members of the anti- bureaucratic social movement Solidarność in Poland, the dissidents of the civic initiative Charta 77 under Václav Havel and the protests of the so-called Orange Revolution and on the Maidan in Kiev. Twenty-five years ago the Monday demonstrations started in Leipzig and other locations in East Germany. They were a series of peaceful protests, a revolution where thousands of people defied the state’s authority with candles in their hands.   "1989" IS NOT ONLY a German phenomenon.  This year, 2014, marks the fortieth anniversary of the so-called Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the coup which overthrew the military regime of Greece, and in 2015 the Spanish can celebrate the anniversary of the Transición, their transition to democracy after Franco’s dictatorship. At that time it became evident that the craving for freedom was stronger than the desire for stability. As Garton Ash put it, the “self-declared realists had proven to be unrealistic and the idealists were looked upon as the better realists.” A century ago, the Germans confronted the ideals of the French Revolution of 1789 — freedom, equality and fraternity — with the “concepts of 1914.” These comprised duty, order and justice, concepts that could only be introduced and ensured by a strong state. That was one hundred years ago when Germans were trying to justify World War I, the “primal catastrophe of the 20th century.” In Europe, the debate among intellectuals focuses on whether that era can actually be compared to our modern times today. I personally believe that this is not right because history does not repeat itself. But much can be learned from history. Even then some intelligent people knew that peace and freedom can only be preserved if Europe finds its way to unity. But smart minds on both sides of the Atlantic were well aware that security cannot be ensured by means of equipment and facilities, spying and intelligence services. The rise of the United States to become the world’s sole superpower began in 1917. Today, the friends of the United States in Europe fear that the US might forget the lessons history has provided through two World Wars and communist and fascist regimes. And they are afraid that freedom is sacrificed to putative security. The Europeans, Americans, and Canadians have to develop a strategy that not only embraces the military challenges, but also moral leadership. That must be the core of all efforts: the message has to be democracy, rule of law, and a free and fair society. This is why we need a common Europe. And transatlantic friendship is the basis for a new world order based on Western values. •

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